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Abstract
The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central
role for economic growth, and this question has not been explored
in much detail so far. How does increasing early innovation appro-
priability a¤ect basic research, applied research, education, and wage
inequality? In the US, what does the common law system imply on
the macroeconomic responses to institutional change?
This paper analyzes the macroeconomic e¤ects of patent protection
by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a
quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We consider three
issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual
property rights; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bar-
gaining power of the upstream innovators; and (c) the implications of
strengthening patent protection on wage inequality and growth.
We show analytically and numerically how the jurisprudential changes
in intellectual property rights witnessed in the US after 1980 can be
related to the well-known changes in wage inequality and in education
attainments. Basic research patents may have grown disproportion-
ately due increasing jurisdictional protection, eventually compromis-
ing applied innovation, education, and growth. By simulations, we
show that the dynamic general equilibrium interations may mislead
the econometric assessment of the temporary vs persistent e¤ects IPR
policy.
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1 Introduction
As is well known, the US economy in the 1980s witnessed the following
phenomena:
1. A sustained increase in the skill premium;
2. A sustained increase in the educated fraction of the population;
3. A strengthening of the intellectual property of upstream research1.
Points 1 and 2 are well known2 in the macroeconomics debate (see Ace-
moglu 2002 for an excellent review) and have motivated explanations based
on directed technical change, ability biased technical change, erosion of low
skilled wages associated with older technologies, globalization, government
procurement. Acemoglu (1998 and 2000b) and Kiley (1999) show that educa-
tion increases the market for the skill complementary inputs, thereby driving
up the protability of innovations that increase the productivity of the skilled
and therefore the returns to higher education. Galor and Moav (2000) of-
fer a theory in which, unlike the direct technical change approach, skills are
endogenous, and the demand for schooling is increasing with ability-biased
technological change, as widely documented empirically. Sector/technology-
specic human capital investment by low skill workers as a source of a positive
relationship between growth and inequality is studied by Gould, Moav, and
Weinberg (2001). Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) show that the decrease
in trade barriers, by enlarging the market size for successful innovations, in-
creases the returns to education. This is so because skilled labour is used
more intensively in the knowledge creation activities. Sener (2001) reinforced
this channel in the presence of unskilled Schumpeterian unemployment. Fi-
nally, Cozzi and Impullitti (2010) document a progressive a change in the US
government expenditure towards a bigger share of high technology goods; this
may have increased the prots of the technologically more dynamic sectors,
thereby increasing the returns to college.
In this paper, we assess the potential marginal importance of point 3: a
strengthening of the intellectual property of upstream research.
In order to provide new insights on the links between intellectual property,
innovation, education and inequality, we combine a closed-country version
of Dinopoulos and Segerstroms (1999) dynamic general equilibrium model
with cumulative innovation and educational choice, with a two-stage cumu-
1"Upstream" is meant to incorporate basic research and early stage development
process.
2For points 1 and 2, see Author et al. (1998).
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lative innovation structure a la Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Green and
Scotchmer (1995). Unlike Chus (2010) unambiguous e¤ect of general IPR
strenghtening on inequality, we show that tightening patent protection in ba-
sic research may increase or decrease wage inequality. Similarly to Furukawa
(2007), increasing upstream patent rights has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on
growth, but due to restricted development rather than reduced experience.
In our framework, basic and applied research technologies are heteroge-
nous and the bargaining power of the upstream innovation changes3, thus
stylizing the evolution of the US jurisprudence after 1980. From that date
on, the US national system of innovation has been re-shaped by a sequence of
important new laws and by a cumulative sequence of sentences that set the
precedents for future modications in the jurisprudence. All these changes
pointed to an increase in the appropriability of innovations at their initial
stages4. Being the US a common-law regime, the jurisprudence evolved grad-
ually5 in the direction of stricter intellectual protection of research tools, basic
research ideas6, etc. This process took a quarter century, culminating in the
2002Madey vs. Duke University Federal Circuits decision, which completed
a process of elimination of the "research exemption" to patent claims. We
conjecture that, along with other factors, it may have contributed to lead the
economy along a transition characterized by increasing wage inequality and
higher education attainements and innovation, after an initial productivity
slowdown. Interestingly, the more recent cases seem to be witnessing an op-
posite trend, most notably Merck vs Integra Lifesciences (2005), in which
the Supreme Court decided to re-a¢ rm research exemption in the pharma-
3Our framework somewhat complements Eicher and García-Peñalosa, (2008), that en-
visages endogenous IPR based on rm choice, instead of on jurisprudence evolution.
4Including the Stevenson-Wydler act of 1980 and the Bayh-Dole act, of 1980, amended
the patent law, to facilitate the commercialization of inventions obtained thanks to gov-
ernment funding, especially by universities. The pro-early innovation cultural change is
also reected in the increasing protection of trade-secrets - starting in the 80s with the
Uniform Trade Secret Act and culminating with the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
(Cozzi, 2001, and Cozzi and Spinesi, 2006) - as well as in the increasingly positive attitude
towards software patents (Hunt, 2001, Hall, 2009), culminating in the Final Computer
Related Examination Guidelines issued by the USPTO in 1996.
5In our case, it is important to recall Janice Muellers (2004) account of the common law
development of a narrow experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability:
with special reference to the discussion of the change in the doctrine from 1976s Pitcairn
v. United States, through 1984s Federal Circuit decision of Roche Products, Inc. v.Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., all the way to Madey v. Duke University in 2002.
6See Gallini (2002), Mueller (2002 and 2004), Scotchmer (2004).
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ceutical sector.
The US legal system, as the legal systems of most of the Commonwealth
countries, includes in the list of the sources of right the common law7. The
essence of the common law is that it is made by judges sitting in courts,
by applying their common sense and knowledge of legal precedent (stare
decisis) to the facts before them. It is founded on the concept of precedence
on how the courts have interpreted the law: under common law the decisions
are reached by analogy, after comparing the facts of a particular case to
similar previous cases. During the early 1980s began a progressive process
in which the U.S. Court decisions changed from the old doctrine limiting the
patentability of early-stage scientic discoveries to the conception that also
fundamental basic scientic ndings (such as genetic engineering procedures
or semiconductor designs) are patentable.
If what deeply characterizes common law (and sharply separates it from
the Continental Europe type legal systems) is an uninterrupted continuity
such that within the stare decisis regime an institutional break point is even
hardly conceivable, we must conclude that the analysis of the e¤ects of the
US patent policy on the economy is forced to include the whole transition
dynamics. The law and economics literature is currently modelling the evo-
lution of the case law in the perspective of analyzing Benjamin Cardozos
and Richard Posners view of common law as e¢ ciency promoting. In fact,
according to this inuential view, unlike civil law, being the common law
decentralized, it follows the aggregate decision making of several heteroge-
nous judges, whose idiosyncratic opinions average one another. Moreover,
the very sequential precedent structure, implies that (Gennaioli and Shleifer,
2007b) one appellate court overrules anothers decision, tending to progres-
sive mitigation and e¢ ciency only if the majority of the judges is unbiased,
depending also on the judges e¤ort cost of changing the legal rule estab-
lished in a precedent. Appellate courts may change a previously established
legal rule also by "distinguishing" the case based on the consideration of
a "previously neglected dimension" (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007a), which
can facilitate convergence towards a more e¢ cient legal rule. We inquire
on whether the increasingly pro-upstream R&D court orientation from 1980
to 2002 has been following an improvement in promoting innovation or if
it has ended up following the bias of less and less liberal judges. In this
7Another important source of change in sharpening IPRs can be driven by special
interests, as studied by Chu (2008).
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paper, we look for potentially detectable aspects of the time series of sev-
eral important variables - skill wage premium, education, innovation, labour
force allocation, market value of patents, etc. - associated with either long-
term evolution of the legal rules. In doing so, we follow a dynamic general
equilibrium perspective, which forces us to assume that economic agents are
su¢ ciently intelligent to detect what "trend" is occurring, and suitably take
optimizing decisions.
In order to analyze the e¤ects of an expected and progressive change in the
patent protection of basic research, we therefore need to simulate all variables
in their transitional dynamics. We will extract lessons from our numerical
results, useful to detect whether an increasingly more strict basic research
protection common law doctrine is gradually facilitating the national system
of innovation or evolving for the worse.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and Section
3 set the model and Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 5 the
growth maximizing steady-state upstream innovator share in a simple special
case, useful as a benchmark. In Section 6 we show the numerical simulations.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
We assume a large number of dynastic families, normalized to 1 for simplicity,
whose members, born at birth rate ~ and passing away at rate , live a period
of duration D. The resulting population growth rate8 is g = ~   > 0. This
demographic structure implies the following restrictions: ~ = ge
gD
egD 1 and
 = g
egD 1 .
At time t the total number of individuals is egt. Each individual can
spend her life working as unskilled or studying the rst Tr < D periods and
then working as skilled. Each individual cares only about the utility of the
average family member. Hence, despite bounded individual life, the individ-
ual decisions are taken within the household by maximizing the following
8Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) have rst developed the overlapping generations
education framework followed here. Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Boucekkine et al. (2007)
recently studied population and human capital dynamics in continuous time and o¤ steady
states and numerically calibrated in a way methodologically more similar to ours.
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intertemporally additive utility functional:
U =
Z 1
0
e tu (t) dt, (1)
where  > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference. Per-family member
instantaneous utility u (t) is dened as:
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
jdjt (!)
#
d!, (2)
where djt (!) is the individual consumption of a good of quality j = 1; 2; :::
and produced in industry ! at time t, and bought at price pjt (!). Parameter
 > 1 measures the size of the quality upgrades.
Dening percapita expenditure on consumption goods asE(t) =
R 1
0
hP
j pjt (!) djt (!)
i
d!,
the real interest rate as i(t), and time 0 family wealth as A(0), the intertem-
poral budget constraint is
R1
0
egt 
R t
0 i()dE (t) dt  A(0).
Following standard steps of quality ladders models9, the consumers will
only buy good with the lowest quality adjusted price, and the Euler equation
follows:
_E(t)=E(t) = i(t)  (+ g) = r(t)  , (3)
where r(t)  i(t)   g is the population growth deated instantaneous
market interest rate at time t, and, together with the transversality condition,
determines consumer choice.
Individuals di¤er in their learning ability , which, for each generation,
is uniformly distributed in the unit interval. Hence an individual of ability
 2 [0; 1] will be able to acquire      units of human capital after an
indivisible training period of length Tr. The only cost of education is the
individuals time, which prevents her from earning the unskilled wage wu. In
what follows we choose unskilled labour as our numeraire, and therefore set
wu(t) = 1 at all t  0.
Hence an individual born at t with (known) ability (t) 2 [0; 1] and who
decides to educate herself will earn nothing from t to t + Tr, and then earn
a skilled wage ow ((t)    )wH(s) at all dates s 2 [t + Tr; t + D], which
implies that at time t there will exist an ability threshold 0(t) 2 [ ; 1] below
9See Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1998).
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which the individual decides to work as an unskilled. Threshold 0(t) solves
the following equation:
Z t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()dds = (0(t)   )
Z t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds,
obtaining
0(t) =   +
R t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()ddsR t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds
. (4)
Since in a steady state i(t) = + g, the steady state level of 0(t) is
0 =   +
1  e (+g)D
[e (+g)Tr   e (+g)D]wH , (5)
where wH denotes the steady state skill premium.
2.2 Manufacturing
In each nal good industry ! 2 [0; 1] and for each quality level j(!) of
the good, production is carried out according to the following Cobb-Douglas
technology
y (!; t) = X (!; t)M1  (!; t) , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (6)
where  2 (0; 1), y (!; t) is the output ow at time t, X (!; t) andM (!; t)
are the skilled and unskilled labour inputs. In each industry rms minimize
costs by choosing input ratios
X (!)
M (!)
=
1
wH(t)

1   . (7)
The total percapita amount M of unskilled labour only works in the
manufacturing sectors. Therefore the aggregate skilled labour demand is
equal to:
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X(!; t) =
1
wH(t)


1  

M(t)P (t) (8)
In percapita terms,
x(!; t)  X(!; t)
P (t)
=
1
wH(t)


1  

M(t)  x(t). (9)
As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), skilled labour can also work in the R&D
sectors. Therefore, a higher skill premium wH(t) frees resources for the R&D
sectors.
We assume instantaneous Bertrand competition in all sectors. Since only
the owner of the most recent top quality good patent can produce the top
quality version of its sector good, the equilibrium price will be equal to a
mark-up  > 1 over the unit cost c(wH(t); 1). Moreover, being demand unit
elastic, percapita demand is d(t) = E
c(wH(t);1)
. Therefore is each sector the
temporary monopolist who owns the top quality product patent earns the
same prot which, in percapita terms, is equal to10:
(t) =
   1

E(t) = (   1)wH(t)x(t)

=
= (   1) 1
1  m(t). (10)
3 R&D and Innovation
The quality level j of each nal product of variety ! 2 [0; 1] can increase
as a result of R&D undertaken by private rms. In order to capture the
interaction between basic and applied research, we assume - as in Cozzi and
Galli (2008) - that a basic research idea is a pre-requisite to applied research
and applied R&D success opens the door for a further basic research advance.
Hence, the innovative process leading to a nal product quality is a two-stage
process. The rst stage - basic research - of the product quality jump is
10The second equality builds on the Cobb-Douglas property that minimum total cost is 
1 

 (1 )
+


1 
 
ws w
1 
u X
 (!)M1  (!). Hence prot is (   1) times total
cost. Using eq. (8) and simplifying gives the result.
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the outcome of a Poisson process with probability intensity 0
P (t)

NB(!;t)
P (t)
 a
per unit of research labour, where 0 > 0 is a basic research productivity
parameter, NB(!; t) is the mass of research labour employed in sector ! at
time t, and a > 0 is a congestion externality parameter.
The second stage - applied research - completes the basic research idea
and generates the new higher quality good according to a Poisson process
with probability intensity 1(t)
P (t)

NA(!;t)
P (t)
 a
per unit of research labour, where
1(t) > 0 is an applied research productivity, viewed by the rms as a con-
stant; NA(!; t) is the mass of research labour employed in sector ! at time t;
and a > 0 is the congestions externality parameter. The presence of popula-
tion size, P (t), in the denominator states that R&D di¢ culty increases with
the total population in the economy11, which delivers endogenous growth
without the strong scale e¤ect12, as suggested by Smulders and Van de
Klundert (1995), Young (1998), Peretto (1998 and 1999), Dinopoulos and
Thompson (1998), Howitt (1999), and recently conrmed empirically by Ha
and Howitt (2006) and Madsen (2008).
Dening nB(!; t)  NB(!;t)P (t) and nA(!; t)  NA(!;t)P (t) , as the skilled labor
employment in each basic and, respectively, applied R&D sector, we can
express the expected innovation rate in a !0 sector undertaking only basic
R&D as 0nB(!0; t)1 a and the expected innovation rate in a !00 sector under-
taking only applied R&D as 1(t)nA(!00; t)1 a. All stochastic processes are
independent both across sectors and across rms. Hence, the existence of a
continuum of sectors implies that the law of large number applies and aggre-
gate variables evolve deterministically. Since all sectors switch from hosting
only basic R&D rms - belonging to subset A0(t)  [0; 1] - to hosting only ap-
plied R&D - belonging to subset A1(t)  [0; 1] - the mass of sectors belonging
to each type will ow deterministically13. Notice that A0(t) [ A1(t) = [0; 1]
and A0(t) \ A1(t) = ;. Moreover, in our model, symmetric equilibria exist,
allowing us to simplify notation: nB(!; t)  nB(t) and nA(!; t)  nA(t).
Therefore, if m(A0(t)) 2]0; 1[ is the Lebesgue mass of the A0(t) subset -
and hence m(A1(t)) = 1 m(A0(t)) the Lebesgue mass of A1(t) subset - its
evolution would be deterministic and described by the following rst order
11Population density favour innovation at the local level (see Hunt, Chatterjee, and
Carlino, 2001): according to this solution to the strong scale e¤ect, the dilution of R&D
is not related to population density, but with the overall size of the economy.
12See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Jones (2005).
13Provided the initial mass Lebesgue mass of each was positive.
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di¤erential equation:
dm(A0(t))
dt
= (1 m(A0(t)))1(t) (nA(t))1 a m(A0(t))0 (nB(t))1 a . (11)
We assume that the aggregate output of basic research increases the
productivity of applied research: 1(t) = 1

1 + 0
hR 1
0
nB(!; t)d!
i1 a'
,
where 1 and ' are positive constants. This formulation introduces the possi-
bility of cross-fertilization of applied research by other sectors basic research
ndings14. In symmetric equilibrium 1(t) = 1
 
1 + 0 [nB(t)]
1 a'.
We assume free entry into basic and applied research. Each inventor, be
she basic or applied, is granted a patent. However, though the rst R&D rm
that invents a new nal product gets the patent anyway, it will infringe the
patent held by the previous basic research inventor. Therefore it will have
to bargain with the basic research patent holder in order to produce the new
version of this good.
Such a framework, incorporating to Green and Scotchmer (1995) research
exemption regime for pure research tools15, captures important aspects of the
real world disputes between inventors whose patent claims allow the blocking
of inventions16. The share, (t) 2]0; 1[, of the nal product (applied) patent
value assigned - at the end of the negotiations taking place at time t - to the
upstream (basic) patent holder17 captures time t court orientation towards
intellectual property. Changes in the jurisprudence towards stronger patent
claims and weakening research exemptions would correspond to increases
in (t), whereas a gradually looser upstream patent holder protection and
14This is complementary to Howitts (1999) assumption of general knowledge, Amaxt ;
being positively a¤ected by the aggregate applied R&D.
15Also see Scotchmer (2004) and Nagaoka and Aoki (2006) for microeconomic analysis
of this important case.
16ODonoghue and Zweimueller (2004) and Chu (2009) are indirectly related, as they
capture the role of patent claims in molding the bargaining between current and future
innovators: their concepts of patentability requirement and leading breadth could be re-
adapted here to accomodate the blocking power of the upstream patent holder.
17Assuming that basic and applied innovators matched and targeted applied innovator-
specic innovations, could re-read this strategic interaction as Aghion and Tiroles (1994a
and b) research unit (RU) and customer (C). Then our case would clearly correspond
to when RUs e¤ort is important ( ~UC > UC), which implies that "the property right is
allocated to RU" (Aghion and Tirole, 1994b, p. 1191). In this light, our (t) generalizes
Aghion and Tiroles (1994a and b) equal split assumption.
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stronger research exemptions would correspond to a declining (t). In the
rest of the paper we will consider gradual changes in patent policy in terms
of the sign of _(t). In fact, we assume that the following holds:
_(t) = (1   )(   (t)): (12)
Equation (12) is a linear di¤erential equation with constant coe¢ cient,
which describes the speed of change in (t) per unit time. Parameter  < 1
guarantees asymptotic stability and  2]0; 1[ is the steady state. We will
consider the progressive tightening of intellectual property rights in the US
as the result of a sudden change in , which determines a gradual increase
in (t) from its previous lower steady state level to its new level. It is
important to notice that we are in a rational expectation framework: all
economic agents after the regime change can predict the successive increases
in (t), and the transition to a tight IPR regime is known to the agents from
the beginning and all decisions are re-optimized. Hence all our numerical
simulations are immune to Lucascritique, unlike other models that, albeit
assuming dynamic general equilibrium, treat the gradual policy changes as a
sequence of surprises. The reason why we think our approach is appropriate is
that from 1980 on IPR policy has steadily and progressively been tightening
and progressively become more and more biased toward earlier innovator.
This steady upstream shift of innovation incentives was too regular not to
be incorporated in peoples expectations18, which leads law scholars to view
1980 as a sort of structural break of equation (12), and forces us to study the
whole transitional dynamics of the models economy. The statutory decisions
taken in the early 1980 triggered a gradual change in the common law19.
4 Equilibrium
Let us dene vB,v0L, and v
1
L as the population-adjusted present expected value
of a basic research patent (vB), of an A0 industry quality leader (v0L ), and
of an A1 industry challenged leader (v1L).
18Unless focussing attention only on a short time span, as in Cozzi and Galli (2008) and
Aghion et al. (2008).
19According to Fon and Parisi (2006), such a case evolution could also appear in a civil
law system.
12
Costless arbitrage between risk free activities and rmsequities imply
that in equilibrium at each instant the following equations shall hold:
wH(t) = 0nB(t)
 avB(t) (13a)
r(t)vB(t) = 1(t)nA(t)
1 a  (t)v0L(t)  vB(t)+ dvB(t)dt (13b)
wH(t) = 1(t)nA(t)
 a (1  (t)) v0L(t) (13c)
r(t)v0L(t) = (t)  0nB(t)1 a
 
v0L(t)  v1L(t)

+
dv0L(t)
dt
(13d)
r(t)v1L(t) = (t)  1(t)nA(t)1 av1L(t) +
dv1L(t)
dt
(13e)
The value of a monopolist in an A0 industry, v0L, has to obey equation
(13d): in fact, the shareholders of the current quality leader compare the
(population growth adjusted) risk free income, rv0L, obtainable from selling
their shares and buying risk free bonds to the expected value of their prots,
, net of probable capital loss, 0n1 aB (v
0
L   v1L), in case a new basic research
result appears in the industry.
As soon as a new basic R&D result appears in the industry, the incumbent
monopolists value falls down to a lower, but still positive, value v1L, which
has to obey eq. (13e): as before, risk free income is equated to expected
prots net of expected capital loss, but now the probability of the basic
research ideas being completed by applied research in the industry, 1n1 aA ,
is the monopolistic prot hazard rate, as the arrival of the new nal product
implies the complete displacement of the current leading edge product.
Equation (13a) characterizes free entry into basic R&D (in an A0 indus-
try), equalizing the skilled wage to the probability 0n aO of inventing times
the value vB of the resulting patent.
Equation (13b) equates the risk free income from selling a basic R&D
patent, rvB, to the expected present value of holding it in an A1 industry.
These expected increase in value deriving from someone elses - the nA down-
stream researchers- discovering the industrial application, of value v0L, plus
the gradual appreciation in the case of someone elses R&D success not
arriving, dvB
dt
.
Equation (13c) is the free entry condition for downstream completers that
rationally expect to appropriate only fraction 1   of the value of the nal
good monopolist.
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As in the previous section, the industrial dynamics of this economy is
described by equation (11):
dm(A0(t))
dt
= (1 m(A0(t)))1(t) (nA(t))1 a m(A0(t))0 (nB(t))1 a . (14)
These equations must be supplemented with the skilled labour market
equilibrium condition
x(t) +m(A0(t))nB(t) + (1 m(A0(t)))nA(t) = h(t), (15)
where h(t)  H(t)=P (t) is the aggregate population-adjusted human capital.
5 Analysis of a Benchmark Special Case
The analytical results of this sections are obtained under the assumption that
 = 0, but since all steady state equations are continuous in all variables
and parameters, comparative statics holds in a positive neighborhood where
 > 0. Notice that in the steady state the real interest rate is i = r + g, and
our assumption implies i = g > 0. Hence equations where  appears do not
formally change20. For simplicity, we will also assume ' = 0: this eliminates
the externality of basic research on applied research.
Notice that eq. (13b), the steady state denition and r = 0 imply:
vB = v
0
L.
From this and from eq.s (13a) and (13c):
nA =

1
0
1  

 1
a
nB. (16)
20More generally, even assuming g = 0, and therefore  = 0 would not imply
complications, as straightforward application of De LHospitals theorem would imply
lim!00 =  + D(D Tr)wH .
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From equations (13d) and (13e), the steady state denition and r = 0 we
can write:
v0L =
"
1
0
 1
a

1  

 1 a
a
+ 1
#
v1L. (17)
Imposing the steady state into (14) and using (16) yields:
Lemma 1. The steady state equilibrium fraction of industries where basic
R&D is active is
m(A0) =
1
1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
: (18)
Lemma 1 indicates is that the higher the di¢ culty of basic research (ap-
plied research), i.e. the lower 0 (the lower 1) the higher the fraction of
sectors where basic (applied) R&D is needed.
This has implications for R&D enhancing regulation:
Proposition 1. The growth maximizing upstream inventor share, , of
the nal good patent value is equal to:
 =
1
0 + 1
=
1
0
1
+ 1
: (19)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that the innovators should be rewarded proportion-
ally more in the stages of R&D where innovation is harder to achieve. Plug-
ging  into eq. (16) implies that at the optimal policy nA = nB. Hence the
optimal share is higher in the (sub-)industries where (equilibrium) innovation
is slower - expected times 1
0n
1 a
B
> 1
1n
1 a
A
imply  > 0:5 and viceversa.
It is important to notice that here  is common across industries without
the risk of a "one-size-ts-all" loss (Chu, 2010) only because all industries are
symmetric. However, with heterogenous industries, it would be interesting
to generalise this result.
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6 Numerical Simulations
In this section we illustrate a representative example of the kind of trajecto-
ries we have obtained for the endogenous variables, following the announce-
ment of a regime change in the law of motion of the share of the nal value of
applied R&D that will be assigned to the basic researcher. This corresponds
to a sudden change in the steady state value of eq. (12) that gradually drives
the system towards the new steady state. We ran several discrete approxima-
tions of the di¤erential equations (27), (30), (12), (33), (13b), (13d), (13e),
(39),(40), (37), (38), (14), and cross-equations restrictions (13a), (13c), (9),
(10), (15), and (34), obtaining remarkably robust results21.
We set the intra-sectorial congestion parameter a = 0:3, consistently with
Jones and Williams(1998) and (2000) calibrations.
We set the mark-up  to 1:68, consistently with what estimated by Roeger
(1995) and Martins et al. (1996).
Parameter  = 1 - the share of high skilled workers22 in manufacturing
production, is consistent with Berman, Bound, and Griliches, (1994).
We set benchmark values of our new parameter at 0 = 1 = 1, ' = 0:01,
but results are robust to huge variations of them.
Parameters D = 40, n = 0:01,Tr = 4,   = 0:75 follow Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (1999).
For the real rate of return on consumer assets, we adopt the usual r =
0:05, common in the literature.
As for the common law adjustment parameter, we set  = 0:9.
We assume that the economy begins with a steady state associated with
a given value of . Then  changes and the common law share of the basic
research inventor starts to head to its new steady state value.
In order to make di¤erent simulations comparable, we plot the trajectories
of the deviations of the value of each variable from its initial steady state
value, divided by its initial steady state value.
Figure 1 assumes that, after a long term (40 periods) initial value of
 = 0:35, it suddenly changes to  = 0:5. As a consequence of Proposition
1, such a change will be benecial for long term growth.
21The Matlab and Dynare les obtained to simulate our model are available upon request
to the authors.
22We here restrict to the share of technician workers in manufacturing in the late Eight-
ies, as indicated by Berman, Bound, and Griliches, (1994). We are ignoring other white
collars, though our simulations are quite robust to alternative specications.
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Figure 1
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Such a change is clearly growth improving from a steady state perspec-
tive: in the long run the new steady state is characterized by a higher rate
of aggregate growth, a higher skill premium, a higher fraction of population
choosing to educate themselves ("college students") and a higher aggregate
human capital. A higher value of  means a higher fraction of the nal inven-
tion appropriated by the basic researcher who invented its basic research pre-
requisite and a lower value of the nal product appropriated by the applied
researcher who invented its commerciable version. Therefore basic research
is becoming more protable (higher "Basic Patent Value", vB) and applied
research less protable. Consequently basic research employment increases -
both at the aggregate ("Basic Research") and at the industry, ("Nb") level -
and applied research employment decreases both at the aggregate ("Applied
R&D") and at the industry, ("Na") level. A consequence of this is that in
the long run the stock market value (v1L) of an A1 monopolist increases - as it
faces less obsolescence - while the long run stock market value (v0L) of an A0
monopolist decreases, as it faces more obsolescence. Since the positive incen-
tives to basic R&D outweigh the negative incentives to applied R&D, R&D
as a whole becomes more protable and more skilled labour is demanded.
Therefore the skill premium, wH , increases, thereby inducing a larger frac-
tion of the population to enrol at university. This will gradually increase the
supply of human capital and decrease the supply of unskilled labour.
In the transitional dynamics, it is important to notice that as the change
in the long-term court orientation  is forecast by the private actors, all
the stock variables - (t), h(t) , m(t) , and m(A0(t)) - are predetermined,
and for example by eq. (10), (t) is constant. Hence only jump variables
such a prices, wages, and employment change. Being (t) monotonically in-
creasing, the relative incentives of basic versus applied research are gradually
changed in favor of basic and to the detriment of applied research. However,
the dynamics of (t) interacts with the intrinsically dynamic nature of the
R&D process, in a way that is not captured by the mere comparative stat-
ics of steady state analysis: in fact, the expectation of higher future values
of (t) certainly favours current basic research - the completion of which
will take place in the future - without harming current applied R&D with
the same intensity. To x ideas, imagine that basic research takes place in
one period, as does applied research: the announcement of a higher  next
period does not penalise current applied R&D while instead encouraging
current basic research - which is promised a higher share of the future dis-
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covery. In our continuous time framework the same e¤ect is at work:

(t) > 0
favours the expectedly late fruits of basic research more than it reduces the
expectedly earliers gains of applied research. As a consequence, aggregate
R&D is favoured, and the increase in the demand for nB(t) is matched by
a lower decrease in the demand for nA(t), which implies that the di¤erence
m(A0(t))nB(t)   [1 m(A0(t))]nA(t) increases and must be matched by a
decrease in x(t): the increase in the net demand for R&D labour can be
satised only by a decrease in the manufacturing skilled-labour employment.
This temporary excess demand for skilled labour is the reason for the imme-
diate increase in the skill premium. As time passes, the increase in w(t) will
encourage marginally less able students to enroll to college, thereby leading
to a future increase in the the aggregate supply of human capital and to a
partially o¤setting e¤ect on w(t). However, as long as (t) keeps increasing
the demand for R&D labour continues to grow, though the decline in

(t)
will eventually correct the previously mentioned intertemporal asymmetry
that favoured basic research more than it disincentived applied R&D.
Interestingly, the aggregate innovation rate initially decreases: the reason
is that R&D is shifting upstream towards basic research, thereby reducing ap-
plied R&D; this slows down the completion of existing basic research projects,
which has a negative e¤ect on innovation. However, in the longer run, the
increase in the ow of basic research results will more than compensate a
thinner applied R&D e¤ort23.
It is interesting to observe an initial slump in innovation follows the ben-
ecial increase in IPR, which may resemble the puzzling "productivity slow-
down" measured in the US during the early Eighties24. Our stylized repre-
sentation suggest that economists should not lose their optimism about in-
novation enhancing policies based on shorter term R&D reallocation e¤ects
coupled with improvements in the population educational choices. Notice
that this explanation of the productivity slowdown complements the obser-
vation of the GDP decrease associated to the mere reduction in skilled labour
manufacturing employment x(t), which is a consequence of the reduction in
available inputs (skilled labour) and therefore not accounted for by the Solow
23Our results remind Waelde (2005) and Waelde and Woitek (2004), which, in a di¤erent
framework, show how economic uctuations originate endogenously in the economy and
the R&D acts as a mechanism able to generate them.
24Of course, other important explanations, based on ITC or on adjustment costs, are
not contradicted by our analysis.
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residual25
Figure 2 assumes that the initial value of  was 0:55 and it suddenly
changes to 0:65. Such a change will be detrimental to long term growth,
because the basic research patent owner gets entitled to too large a share of
the nal invention value. This discourages applied R&D too much, which
more than o¤sets the increase in basic research. Therefore the demand for
skilled labour will fall and so will the skill premium and education.
25Clearly, in our model the Solow residual is constant, in so far as we stick to the as-
sumption of quality improving innovation in the nal good sectors. However, following
Grossman and Helpman (1991), we could easily re-interprete our model in terms of inter-
mediate good quality improvements. In that case, the innovation slowdown corresponds
to the measured productivity slowdown based on Solow decomposition of the increase in
output, after accounting for the increase in unskilled and skilled labour inputs.
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Interestingly, the short term reactions of the skill premium and of man-
ufacturing production could inspire wrong interpretations of the true long
term e¤ect of normative changes. In fact, as in the previous discussion, upon
impact all stock variables are given, and mainly short term announcement
e¤ects prevail. Most notably, the expected gradual increase in (t) fails to
penalize current applied R&D in the order of magnitude as it favours current
basic research: basic R&D will be entitled to a larger share of the results
of future applied R&D, not those of current applied R&D. Such temporary
win-win situation boosts aggregate R&D labour and therefore raises the skill
premium. However, as

(t) sets in, the temporary relief for applied R&D dis-
appears, and its smaller share of the nal product patent penalizes it so much
that the ensuing drop in R&D employment outweighs the increase in basic
research employment - the whole e¤ect being corroborated by the gradual
increase in 1 m(A0(t)) - dragging the skill premium below the initial steady
state level and therefore leading towards the new steady state, characterized
by less R&D employment and less innovation.
Interestingly, in all our simulations so far, a gradual increase in (t) always
leads to an immediate increase in w(t): hence future strengthening upstream
innovation always increases the skill premium. Conversely, a gradual decrease
in (t) always leads to an immediate decrease in w(t). However, the long-
term impact of these changes in (t) depend on whether or not the change is
growth enhancing. When it is growth enhancing w(t) will eventually reach
a higher steady state level, whereas the opposite holds when the long-term
court orientation is detrimental to growth.
The following table summarizes the e¤ects of a gradual change in (t) -
i.e. of

(t) - on w(t):
Short-Run Long-Run
Growth Enhancing

 > 0 Higher w Higher w
Growth Harming

 > 0 Higher w Lower w
Growth Enhancing

 < 0 Lower w Higher w
Growth Harming

 < 0 Lower w Lower w
As a result, our simulations warn the policy makers against relying on
empirical evaluations of IPR changes based on relatively short term e¤ects.
The short term e¤ects of a harmful tightening, respectively relaxing, of the
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upstream IPR look misleadingly similar to those of a benecial bargaining
power transfer towards, respectively from, the basic researcher institutions.
The gures shown in this section are considerably robust and representa-
tive of the pro-upstream IPR changes mentioned so far: changing parameters
we have observed very similar patterns of short-run and long-run dynamics26.
7 Conclusions
The possibility that in the real world innovators may use their patents to
block future innovators, and/or prevent them from commercialising their
products, raised a still increasing concern27 not only among academics. The
adoption by the US patent law of a statutory research exemption has been
proposed as a denitive solution to this problem. But, by postponing bar-
gaining between innovators it may put the downstream inventor at disadvan-
tage: when is this disadvantage socially benecial? Can we detect this from
the data? This paper has tried to answer these important questions from a
dynamic macroeconomic perspective.
We have shown how the gradual evolution that characterizes the com-
mon law system implies gradual dynamics of the allocation of R&D, human
capital, innovation, and wage inequality. In light of well known evidence
of the steady increase in the skill premium and in education that has been
occurring in the Eighties and Nineties in the US and that set the basis for
the parallel innovative boom, our simulations suggest that the driving force
could have consisted in a benecial gradual change of the court orientation,
in favour of more protection of previously under-protected early stage in-
novators. On the other hand, should at some point early stage innovators
become too protected, opposite trends could appear, as illustrated in Section
6.
Since the common law system implies gradual change to new IPR regimes,
we have been forced to study the whole transitional dynamics. The transition
to a stricter regime does not appear to always be monotonic, which shows
how assessments based on short term data could be mis-leading for policy
26The les used to generate them are available to the interested readers.
27Heller and Eisemberg (1998) suggested the existence of a tragedy of the anticommons,
i.e. a proliferation of upstream intellectual property rights which greatly amplify the
transaction cost of downstream R&D, thus hampering downstream research for biomedical
advance.
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makers. For example, benecial restrictions of IPR may result in a temporary
reduction in innovation, which may seem a bizarre productivity slowdown.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From eq. (32) and (5) follows that the steady
state level of human capital percapita is an increasing function of the skilled
premium wH , which we can write as h(wH).
Plugging eq. (16) into the skilled labour market clearing condition (15)
yields:
"
m(A0) + (1 m(A0))

1
0
1  

 1
a
#
nB = h(wH)  x(wH)  	(wH) (20)
with 	0(wH) > 0. Inserting eq. (18) into (20) we obtain:
nB


1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
 = h(wH)  x(wH)  	(wH) (21)
Plugging eq. (17) into eq. (13a) and (13e) we obtain:
wH = 0n
 a
B v
0
L = 0n
 a
B 
"
1
0
 1
a

1  

 1 a
a
+ 1
#
v1L (22a)
 = 1n
1 a
A v
1
L = 1

1
0
1  

 1 a
a
n1 aB v
1
L (22b)
From the denition of prots and the steady state mass of unskilled
labour, we know that  = (wH), with 0(wH) < 0. Dividing the last two
equations side by side implies:
nB
1


1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
 = (wH)
wH
. (23)
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Plugging (23) into (21) gives:
1 = 	(wH)
wH
(wH)
 (wH) (24)
where 0(wH) > 0. Therefore there exists a unique steady state level of
the skill premium obtained as the solution to eq. (24). It is important to
notice that, in this example, the steady state skill premium is independent
of .
The steady state innovation rate can be rewritten, after using (23), as:
0n
1 a
B m(A0) =
h
(wH)
wH
i1 a
1 a
1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
a = (25)
=
h
(wH)
wH
i1 a

1
0
 1
a

1

 1 a
a
+

1
1
 1
a

1
1 
 1 a
a
a (26)
The numerator does not change with  as previously proved. The innova-
tion rate is maximized when the denominator is minimized. Hence we need
to nd a value of  such that

1
0
 1
a

1

 1 a
a
+

1
1
 1
a

1
1 
 1 a
a
is minimized,
which implies expression (19).QED.
8.1 Labour Supply and Education Dynamics
8.1.1 Unskilled Labor Supply
As previously shown, individuals born at t with ability (t) 2 [0; 0(t)] op-
timally choose not to educate themselves, thereby immediately joining the
unskilled labour force. Hence a fraction 0(t) of cohort t remains unskilled
their whole life. Summing up over all the older unskilled who are still alive
- hence born in the time interval [t   D; t] - we obtain the total stock of
unskilled labour as of time t:
M(t) =
Z t
t D
~N(s)0(s)ds = ~
Z t
t D
egs0(s)ds
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where ~ is the birth rate, N(s) is the population at time s.
To stationarize variables, we divide by current (time t) population egs,
obtaining:
m(t)  M(t)
N(t)
= ~
Z t
t D
eg(s t)0(s)ds.
Its steady state level is:
m = ~
1  eg( D)
g
0 = 0.
The change in the stock of the population-adjusted stock of unskilled
labour is obtained by derivating m(t) with respect to time:
_m(t) = ~0(t)  ~e gD0(t D)  gm(t) (27)
As in Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Boucekkine et al. (2007) we obtain a
crucial role for delayed di¤erential equations.
8.1.2 College Population
The individuals born in t with ability (t) 2 [0(t); 1] optimally choose to
educate themselves, thereby becoming college students for a training period
of duration Tr. Hence summing up over all the previous cohorts who are still
in college - hence born in the time interval [t   Tr; t] - we obtain the total
stock of college population as of time t:
eC(t) = ~ Z t
t Tr
N(s)(1  0(s))ds = ~
Z t
t Tr
egs(1  0(s))ds.
In percapita terms:
ec(t)  eC(t)
N(t)
= ~
Z t
t Tr
N(s)
N(t)
(1 0(s))ds = ~
Z t
t Tr
eg(s t)(1 0(s))ds. (28)
In a steady state:
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ec = ~ 1  eg( Tr)
g
(1  0). (29)
Taking the derivative of eq. (28) with respect to time we obtain:
:ec(t) = ~ (1  0(t))  ~e gTr (1  0(t D))  gec(t). (30)
8.1.3 Human Capital
The stock of skilled workers will coincide with those students who have com-
pleted their education and are still alive, born in [t D; t  Tr]:
eH(t) = ~ Z t Tr
t D
N(s)(1  0(s))ds = ~N(t)
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s))ds (3)
The total workforce (including students) in equilibrium equals total pop-
ulation, hence:
M(t) + eH(t) + C(t) = egt.
Due to heterogeneous learning abilities, in order to obtain the aggregate
skilled labour supply, we need to multiply each skilled worker by the average
amount of human capital that she can supply, given by the average skill of
her cohort net of dispersion parameter  :
Z 1
0(t)
(    ) 1
1  0(t)d =
1 + 0(t)  2 
2
.
Therefore the aggregate amount of skilled labour in e¢ ciency units (skilled
labor supply) is:
H(t) = ~N(t)
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s)) (1 + 0(s)  2 )
2
ds
Dividing by time t population, we can express percapita human capital
as:
h(t)  H(t)
N(t)
=
~
2
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s)) (1 + 0(s)  2 ) ds. (31)
27
The steady state value is:
h = ~

eg( Tr)   eg( D) (1  0) (1 + 0   2 )
2g
(32)
The dynamics of human capital can be studied by derivating this expres-
sion with respect to time:
:
h(t) =  gh(t) +
~
2
e gTr(1  0(t  Tr)) (1 + 0(t  Tr)  2 )  (33)
+
~
2
e gD(1  0(t D)) (1 + 0(t D)  2 ) .
8.2 Transitional Properties of Educational Choice
The study of the transition dynamics of this model is complicated by the
skilled/unskilled labour dynamics and by the endogenous education choice
under perfect foresight. Key to the solution is the transformation of the
integral equation for the ability threshold level for education into a set of
di¤erential equations.
Dening the present value of the unskilled wage incomes as WU(t) =R t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()dds and the present value of the skilled wage income asWS(t) =R t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds, we know from (4) that
0(t) =   +
WU(t)
WS(t)
. (34)
Dening
R1(t) = e
  R t+Dt i()d , and (35)
R2(t) = e
  R t+Trt i()d (36)
we can write:
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_WU(t) = R1(t)  1 + i(t)WU(t) (37)
_WS(t) = R1(t)wH(t+D) R2(t)wH(t+ Tr) + i(t)WS(t). (38)
Di¤erentiating eq.s (35)-(36) with respect to time we obtain:
_R1(t) = R1(t)(i(t)  i(t+D)), and (39)
_R2(t) = R2(t)(i(t)  i(t+ Tr)). (40)
These equations allow us to cast our model in a framework that can be
studied in terms of delayed di¤erential equations.
8.3 Expenditure and Manufacturing Dynamics
From eq.s (10) follows:
   1

E(t) = (   1) 1
1  m(t). (41)
Log-di¤erentiating with respect to time, using Euler equation (3) and the
unskilled law of motion (27) yield:
i(t)  (+ g) =
_E(t)
E(t)
=
_m(t)
m(t)
=
~0(t)  ~e gD0(t D)
m(t)
  g (42)
that - since r(t) = i(t)  g - can be rewritten as
r(t)   =
~0(t)  ~e gD0(t D)
m(t)
  g, (43)
In the steady state: r(t) = .
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